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Abstract
Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer whose values
for the items are arbitrarily correlated. It was previously shown that, in such settings, distri-
butions exist for which the seller’s optimal revenue is infinite, but the best “simple” mechanism
achieves revenue at most one (Briest et al. [5], Hart and Nisan [22]), even when m = 2. This
result has long served as a cautionary tale discouraging the study of multi-item auctions without
some notion of “independent items”.
In this work we initiate a smoothed analysis of such multi-item auction settings. We consider
a buyer whose item values are drawn from an arbitrarily correlated multi-dimensional distri-
bution then randomly perturbed with magnitude δ under several natural perturbation models.
On one hand, we prove that the [5, 22] construction is surprisingly robust to certain natural
perturbations of this form, and the infinite gap remains.
On the other hand, we provide a smoothed model such that the approximation guarantee of
simple mechanisms is smoothed-finite. We show that when the perturbation has magnitude δ,
pricing only the grand bundle guarantees an O(1/δ)-approximation to the optimal revenue. That
is, no matter the (worst-case) initially correlated distribution, these tiny perturbations suffice
to bring the gap down from infinite to finite. We further show that the same guarantees hold
when n buyers have values drawn from an arbitrarily correlated mn-dimensional distribution
(without any dependence on n).
Taken together, these analyses further pin down key properties of correlated distributions
that result in large gaps between simplicity and optimality.
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1 Introduction
How should a revenue-maximizing seller sell heterogeneous goods to interested buyers? This prob-
lem has been extensively studied by economists and computer scientists alike, from a variety of
perspectives. One major highlight from these works is numerous impossibility results, essentially
proving that one cannot hope to find a mechanism that is simple, yet optimal in general set-
tings [5, 22, 23, 16]. A major highlight on the flip side are numerous approximation results, where
simple mechanisms are now known to be approximately optimal in quite general (but still struc-
tured) settings [10, 24, 11, 21, 2].
Perhaps the clearest example demonstrating the interaction of these two lines of work is the
following. Consider a single additive buyer whose values for the two items are drawn jointly from
a two-dimensional distribution D1. Then there exist correlated distributions D such that the
revenue-optimal mechanism achieves infinite revenue, yet the revenue of any simple mechanism is
at most 1 [5, 22]. Without getting into details of exactly what “simple” means2, this impossibility
result rules out any hope of simple mechanisms that are even approximately optimal for all two-
dimensional D. Still, a fantastic complementary result shows that if the two item values are drawn
independently, selling separately (post a price pi for each item and let the buyer purchase a single
item i for pi, or both for p1+p2) guarantees a 2-approximation [21]. So while the impossibility results
for arbitrary D are quite strong, compelling positive results still exist under natural assumptions.
This avenue turned out to be quite productive: A long line of work recently culminated in a
simple and approximately optimal mechanism for any number of buyers with subadditive valuations
over any number of independent items [10, 11, 12, 25, 21, 27, 2, 35, 32, 7, 9, 6]. Modeling assumptions
aside, this body of works constitutes a major contribution to the theory of optimal auction design.
The impact of these works notwithstanding, one key direction is left largely unaddressed: even
as these works generalized in various directions (arbitrary feasibility constraints, combinatorial val-
uations, etc.), the “independent items” assumption remained. Even the few works that pose models
of limited correlation have some underlying notion of independence (e.g. there are “independent
features,” and item values depend linearly on features) [12, 3]. While “independent items” is a
perfectly natural assumption (and we have greatly deepened our understanding of mechanism de-
sign under it), it was never intended to be ubiquitous in all future works. This is especially true
due to the nature of the motivating impossibility result: the D witnessing these impossibilities is
so carefully crafted (we overview the construction in Section 3) that it is far removed from any
“real-world” motivation. That is, the constructions provided in [5, 22] require carefully building D
by perfectly placing the infinitely many points in its support just so, and even a tiny deviation in
the construction would cause the entire argument to collapse. The thoughtful reader may at this
point be thinking: if this construction is so fragile that even a tiny deviation breaks it, perhaps a
smoothed analysis might prove insightful. Indeed, this is the focus of this paper.
So, what might a “smoothed” distribution look like? Given an arbitrarily correlated distribution
D, its smoothing Dˆ first draws a valuation vector v from D, and then randomly perturbs v to vˆ
(where the size of the perturbation is parameterized by some δ > 0). This makes sense for the same
reason that it makes sense in all other applications of smoothed analysis: these distributions come
from somewhere (e.g. past data), inevitably in the presence of tiny noise.
1That is, (v1, v2) ∼ D, and the buyer’s value for receiving both items is v1 + v2 (and receiving just item i is vi).
2Formally, these results show lower bounds on a measure of simplicity called the menu-size complexity.
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1.1 What Makes a Good Smoothed Model?
Once we’ve decided to do smoothed analysis, we also need to pick a model of random perturbation.
We’ll be interested in balancing relevance (e.g. how natural a model is) with transparent analysis
(e.g. what insights can we derive?). To help illustrate this point, consider the following perturbation
proposal: assume that D is supported on [0, vmax]2,3 and perturb v by adding a uniformly random
vector from [0, δvmax]
2.
This is indeed a natural starting point. Unfortunately, the model lends itself to a trivial analysis.
Specifically, we can first conclude that the optimal revenue for D (respectively Dˆ) is at most 2vmax
(respectively 2vmax(1 + δ)). Moreover, for Dˆ, we can set a price of δvmax on the grand bundle
(that is, allow the buyer to pay δvmax to receive all items or 0 to receive nothing), which sells with
probability at least 1/2. Therefore, the revenue achieved by bundling all items together (henceforth,
BRev(Dˆ)) is at least δvmax/2, immediately guaranteeing an O(1/δ)-approximation. For the sake
of completeness, we include an improved analysis in Appendix E showing that BRev(Dˆ) is in
fact a O(ln(1/δ))-approximation in this model (and that this is nearly tight). So, while technically
there’s a “positive result” here, we simply don’t learn much from this exercise. For readers especially
interested in the modeling aspect, Appendix F overviews similar issues with alternative models.
From here, we consider two natural modifications. We call the first Rectangle-Shift, which
essentially replaces the additive shift of the previous model with a multiplicative shift. In this
model, values (v,w) are perturbed to (v+ε1v,w+ε2w), where each εi is drawn independently from
U [0, δ]. Our first main result proves that in fact the infinite gap persists in this model! That is, for
all δ < 1/2, there exists a correlated D such that the corresponding Dˆ satisfies Rev(Dˆ) = ∞ but
BRev(Dˆ) ∈ O(1) (which implies that any “simple” mechanism achieves finite revenue as well).
Theorem 1.1. For all δ < 1/2, there exists a bivariate distribution D such that for its corresponding
perturbed distribution Dˆ in the Rectangle-Shift model, BRev(Dˆ) ∈ O(1) and Rev(Dˆ) =∞.
We call our second model Square-Shift, which essentially replaces the scale vmax in the ini-
tial model with max{v,w}. In this model, values (v,w) are perturbed to (v + ε1max{v,w}, w +
ε2max{v,w}), where each εi is drawn independently from U [0, δ]. Our second main result shows
that BRev(Dˆ) ∈ Ω(δ ·Rev(Dˆ)) (and this is nearly tight, see Appendix C.2).
Theorem 1.2. In the Square-Shift model, for a single additive buyer and 2 items
Rev(Dˆ) ≤
√
2π(1 + δ)3 log (1 + δ)
δ2
BRev(Dˆ) ∈ O
(
1
δ
·BRev(Dˆ)
)
.
Before continuing, we briefly share the distinguishing feature causing Rectangle-Shift to admit
an infinite gap, yet Square-Shift to admit finite approximations: the angle by which a buyer’s
valuation vector may be perturbed. Observe that in the Rectangle-Shift model, valuation vectors
extremely close to an axis remain extremely close to that axis after perturbation. This fact turns
out to be crucial in enabling a lower bound construction. On the other hand, valuation vectors in
the Square-Shift model are likely to have their angle non-trivially perturbed. This property turns
out to be crucial in establishing our approximation guarantee. Of course, both results require much
more than this simple observation, but this property is the distinguishing factor causing results in
the two models to diverge.
We conclude with two additional technical observations. First, note that in both models
BRev(D) ≈ BRev(Dˆ) (unlike the initial additive model). This means that the entirety of our
3The constructions of [5, 22] work subject to this, but one has to replace “infinite gap” with “unbounded gap”.
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analysis rests on studying Rev(Dˆ), and determining whether the perturbations guarantee that it’s
finite. Second, note that in both models Dˆ stochastically dominates D. Therefore, when we prove in
Theorem 1.2 that Rev(Dˆ) is bounded, this is not because we perturbed the buyer into valuing the
items less, but really because this perturbation negates whatever bizarre properties of the original
D led to Rev(D) =∞. This serves as another example of revenue non-monotonicity [23].
Brief Discussion of Models. The refuted additive-noise model perhaps seems most natural
from a mathematical perspective (indeed, it is the most similar to models used in prior smoothed
analysis). From an economic perspective, this is somewhat natural as well (each consumer in the
population makes errors on the scale of, e.g., $10, while no consumer values any item more than
$1 million). The “Rectangle-Shift” model is also uncontroversially natural from both perspectives:
a consumer’s value for item j is inaccurately measured proportional to her value for item j. The
“Square-Shift” model requires a touch more thought. From a mathematical perspective, it is simply
replacing the universal $1 million scale for all consumers in the population with a scale proportional
to that consumer’s value for the items. From an economic perspective, it may initially seem
uncompelling that a high value for one item may cause larger error in estimating the value of the
other item. However, numerous works in the behavioral economics literature suggest that bidders
indeed value items differently in the presence or absence of more/fewer valuable items [1, 30, 26, 28].
For example, in an experiment of [30], the authors observed that a buyer’s willingness to pay for a
cheap item (a CD) was (statistically significantly) higher when a second item (a sweater) was being
sold at 80$ than when it was being sold at 10$.
1.2 Extensions: Many Buyers and Many Items
After resolving the single-buyer, two-item case, the natural question is whether a similar analysis
extends to multiple buyers or multiple items. For the Rectangle-Shift model, the impossibility
results extend to the multi-item case, so we focus on the Square-Shift model. For n buyers and
two items, we consider an arbitrarily correlated 2n-dimensional distribution D (denoting n buyers’
values for two items). Our perturbation then draws εij independently and uniformly from [0, δ] for
all buyers i, and j ∈ {1, 2}, and maps vij to vij + εij maxj′∈{1,2} vij′ . In other words, while the
buyers’ values are correlated, the perturbations are independent (and only depend on that buyer’s
values).
In this model, we’re again able to prove that RonenRev(Dˆ) ∈ Ω(δ ·DSICRev(Dˆ)) (and this
is again nearly tight). Here, DSICRev(Dˆ) denotes the revenue of the optimal dominant-strategy
truthful mechanism4, andRonenRev(Dˆ) denotes the revenue achievable by running Ronen’s simple
single-item auction [31] for the grand bundle, i.e. treat the grand bundle as a single-item auction
and run Ronen’s auction. See Section 2 for the definition of Ronen’s auction — it is a second-
price auction with reserve, but the reserve depends on the other buyers’ bids. If D happens to
be independent across buyers, but still correlated across items, we further get RonenRev(Dˆ) ∈
Ω(δ · BICRev(Dˆ)), where BICRev(Dˆ) is the revenue of the optimal BIC mechanism. Note that
the guarantee does not depend on n.
Finally, we consider the single-buyer, multi-item case. The extension of the Square-Shift model
is the obvious one: perturb each value independently by U([0, δ]) ·maxj vj. Here, we show that our
techniques extend, but give BRev(Dˆ) ∈ Ω˜(δm ·Rev(Dˆ)). Furthermore, the exponential dependence
4That is, it is in each buyer’s interest to report their true value, no matter the behavior of the other buyers.
Contrast this with Bayesian truthful, where it is in each buyer’s interest to report their true value as long as the
other buyers do so as well. Note that we cannot hope to replace DSICRev(Dˆ) with BICRev(Dˆ) here due to [18] -
see Section 2 for further discussion.
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on m is unavoidable: a simple counterexample provides a D such that for δ ∈ O(1), BRev(Dˆ) <
m
2m · Rev(Dˆ) (Appendix C.3). Our analysis extends to the m-item n-buyer case, again obtaining
an approximation guarantee exponential in m.
Theorem 1.3. In the Square-Shift model, for a single additive buyer and m items
Rev(Dˆ) ≤
(√
πe
2
(1 + δ)
δ
)m
(1 + δ) log(1 + δ)m
√
m ·BRev(Dˆ).
Theorem 1.4. For the n additive buyer, m item, Square-Shift model,
Rev(Dˆ) ≤ 4
(√
πe
2
(1 + δ)
δ
)m
(1 + δ) log(1 + δ)m
√
m ·RonenRev(Dˆ),
where Rev(Dˆ) = DSICRev(Dˆ) for correlated buyers, and Rev(Dˆ) = BICRev(Dˆ) for independent
buyers.
Our analysis further extends to settings beyond those where the buyers’ valuation is additive
across items. For example, all of our positive results hold for the general class of valuations which
are additive subject to downwards-closed constraints, at the cost of an additional factor of m; we
discuss this in detail in Section 5.
1.3 Related Work and Roadmap
The present paper is the first to explore smoothed analysis in auction design. Other hybrid worst-
case/average-case guarantees have been studied, for instance, in the digital goods setting (e.g. [20,
19, 13]), where at a high level, auctions compete instance-by-instance against any auction that
could potentially be optimal in the average-case. Work of Carroll [8] on robust mechanism design
is also thematically related, and argues that simple mechanisms are optimal if the auctioneer wishes
to obtain a worst-case guarantee against all value distributions consistent with given marginals (but
neither directly nor indirectly addresses the concepts in the constructions of [5, 22]).
There is a growing body of related literature on multi-item auction design, largely proving
impossibility results for arbitrarily correlated distributions (e.g. [5, 22]), or approximation results
for distributions with “independent items” (e.g. [10, 11, 12, 25, 21, 27, 2, 35, 32, 7, 9, 6]). Limited
work exists on models with limited correlation, but such models make use of the same tools,
essentially replacing “independent items” with “independent features” and items that are linear
combinations of features [12, 3]. The present paper is the first tractable multi-item model of limited
correlation that doesn’t rely on these tools.
Smoothed analysis is a popular framework for analyzing algorithms on “real-world worst-case”
inputs. Smoothed analysis most commonly refers to smoothed computational complexity (e.g. an
algorithm might run in exponential time in the worst case, but in polynomial time if the worst-case
inputs are randomly perturbed), and has been an extremely influential paradigm [34]. For instance,
the Simplex Method for solving LPs is known to take exponential time in the worst case, but has
smoothed-polynomial computational complexity [33]. More similar in spirit to the present paper
is prior work that considers the smoothed competitive ratio of online algorithms [4] or smoothed
approximation ratio of mechanisms [17]. The motivation for considering smoothed analysis in these
works is, of course, similar to ours, but there is no similarity in techniques: the process of proving
smoothed guarantees is a domain-specific process.
Roadmap: Section 2 poses our model and some preliminaries. Section 3 presents our lower bound
for the Rectangle-Shift model. In Section 4 we present our results in the Square-Shift model,
4
including its extension to multiple buyers and multiple items. Appendix A contains a detailed
summary of our results in the Square-Shift model, as well as comparisons with known results for
independent items. Extensions beyond additive buyers are presented in Section 5. Nearly tight
bounds for the additive noise model can be found in Appendix E.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we study auctions with n buyers who are bidding for m ≥ 2 items. Each
buyer i draws its valuation vector vi for the items from an m-dimensional distribution Di with
density fi, and we refer to D as the joint nm-dimensional distribution. The buyer has value vi,j for
the j-th item, with marginal distribution Di,j . Our results do not assume any kind of independence
between buyers or items. That is, Di,j can be correlated with Di,j′ (same buyer different item),
as well as Di′,k (different buyer and possibly different item). For now, all buyers considered are
additive, quasi-linear, and risk-neutral (or expected utility maximizers). See Section 5 for extensions
to non-additive valuation functions.
Mechanisms and Benchmarks. As with many results in approximate mechanism design we
compare the optimal revenue attainable to benchmarks that result from simple mechanisms. For
a single buyer, let Rev(D) be the optimal revenue that can be extracted by a truthful mechanism
when valuations are sampled according to D. Let BRev(D) be the optimal revenue that can be
attained by selling the grand bundle as a single item — that is to say, the mechanism posts a
single price and allocates all the items if the bidder is willing to pay that price, otherwise it charges
nothing and allocates nothing. For multiple buyers, let BICRev(D) denote the optimal revenue
that can be extracted by a BIC mechanism (see Appendix B for a formal definition for correlated
buyers), DSICRev(D) denote the optimal revenue that can be extracted by a DSIC mechanism,
and RonenRev(D) denote the revenue extracted by Ronen’s single-item auction (treating the
grand bundle as a single item). Ronen’s auction will always award the item to the highest bidder
(or no one), and the price charged is the maximum of the second-highest bid and a per-buyer
reserve (that depends on the other buyers’ bids). Ronen shows that for any single-item setting,
2RonenRev(D) ≥ DSICRev(D). Fu et al. [18] show that RonenRev(D) does not generally
guarantee any finite approximation to BICRev(D), but that under some assumptions it attains a
5-approximation.5
Models. We consider two different smoothing models and refer to the resulting distributions as
Dˆi. The magnitude of the perturbation depends on a parameter δ. We write fˆi for the density of
Dˆi. R(xˆ, δ) = {x|x can get mapped to xˆ} is the set of points that could map to xˆ under a certain
model with parameter δ; the model will always be clear from the context and is omitted from
notation. We also drop δ when clear from the context, and write R−1(x, δ) for the set of points
that x maps to. The models we consider are (see Figures 1a, 1b in Appendix A for illustrations):
• Rectangle-Shift: buyer i’s value vi is replaced by vˆi with vˆij = vij + δjvij where each δj is
sampled independently from U [0, δ]. Intuitively, this spreads the mass f(v) uniformly on the
m-parallelepiped with side lengths δv and v as its smallest vertex.
5All of these claims assume that the mechanism is required to be ex-post individually rational, due to seminal
work of Cremer and McLean [14]: see Appendix B for further discussion.
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• Square-Shift: buyer i’s value vi is replaced by vˆi with vˆij = vij + δj maxk vik where each δj
is sampled independently from U [0, δ]. Intuitively, this spreads the mass f(v) uniformly on the
m-dimensional cube with side length δmaxk vik and v as its smallest vertex.
As mentioned earlier, it is known that even for the single buyer, two items case, the gap between
Rev(D) and BRev(D) is unbounded when there is correlation between the items [5, 22]. In this
paper we compare Rev(Dˆ) and BRev(Dˆ) as a function of δ.
3 Persistence of Infinite Gap in the Rectangle-Shift Model
In this section we first overview the key ideas from [5, 22], and then present our construction
witnessing an infinite gap in the Rectangle-Shift model. Proofs missing from this section can be
found in Appendix C.1. Recall this section’s main result:
Theorem 1.1. For all δ < 1/2, there exists a bivariate distribution D such that for its corresponding
perturbed distribution Dˆ in the Rectangle-Shift model, BRev(Dˆ) ∈ O(1) and Rev(Dˆ) =∞.
The key insight behind the [5, 22] construction is the following: assume that you have k points
in the positive orthant of the unit hypercube, x1, . . . ,xk, such that xi · xj < xi · xi − ε for all i, j.
If the valuation vectors in the support of our distribution are exactly x1, . . . ,xk, we can design a
mechanism such that when the bidder reports a valuation of xi, the mechanism offers a randomized
allocation (or lottery) of xi for price ε. When the buyer has valuation vector xi, they get utility
xi ·xi−ε for the lottery designed for them, which is greater than the utility of reporting some other
valuation xj, xi · xj . Therefore, their utility for purchasing the lottery tailored for them exceeds
their value for any other lottery (and therefore their utility as well). This guarantees that the buyer
will always purchase the lottery designed for them. Observe that simply selling the grand bundle
at price ε achieves just as much revenue, so this idea is just the first building block.
From here, [5, 22] modify this construction to increase Rev while keeping BRev small. The
second insight is that if the valuation vectors in the support are actually 2ixi, then we can offer
the lottery xi for price ε · 2i and the buyer will still always prefer their tailored lottery to any other
one, because their utility will be 2i(xi · xi − ε) > 2ixi · xj, which is their value for the lottery xj .
Therefore, if the buyer has value 2i · xi with probability 2−i, Rev can be quite large, while BRev
will remain small. Of course, there are still some details left to work out, such as exactly how to
analyze Rev and BRev, and we’ve also simplified the key ideas at the cost of technical accuracy,
but these are the main ideas we’ll borrow from previous work: the point is that these constructions
are packing points inside the unit hypercube with small pairwise dot products. Our construction
is a “perturbation robust” version of that of [22], as we have to show not only that xi will prefer
the intended option, but that any smoothing of xi will prefer it as well.
The intuition of the preceding paragraphs is captured by Lemma 1 below. For a set of points
x1,x2, · · · ∈ [0, 1]2 let gapiδ = minj<i,xˆi∈R−1(xi,δ) xˆi · (xi − xj). That is, gapiδ roughly captures the
minimum angle between any smoothing of xi and any xj , j < i. First, we show that given any such
set of points, there exists a distribution D such that BRev(Dˆ) is at most a constant, but there
exists an auction that extracts revenue
∑∞
i=1 gap
i
δ. Roughly speaking, D has a type vi for every
point xi, such that all post-perturbation types vˆi prefer randomized allocation xi at price qi = gap
i
δ
over any other (allocation, price) pair (xj , qj). The proof of Lemma 1 is similar to Proposition 9
of [22]6 after adjusting for our perturbations.
6This is clearer when compared to Proposition 5.1 in the arXiv version of [22] uploaded April 22nd, 2013.
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Lemma 1. In the Rectangle-Shift model, for all δ < 1/2, and sequences of points x1,x2, ... ∈ [0, 1]2,
there exists a bivariate distribution D, such that for its corresponding perturbed distribution Dˆ it
holds that BRev(Dˆ) ∈ O(1) and Rev(Dˆ) ≥∑∞i=1 gapiδ.
Once we have Lemma 1, the crux of the proof becomes constructing a set of points such
that
∑∞
i=1 gap
i
δ diverges. We indeed follow an outline similar to the construction of [22], but
the requirement that any smoothing of xi has sufficiently large angle with all xj (versus just xi
itself) poses additional challenges. We include a fairly detailed overview below, with proofs of the
key steps.
Lemma 2. For all δ < 1/2, there exist a countably infinite set of points x1,x2, · · · ∈ [0, 1]2, such
that
∑
i gap
i
δ diverges.
Proof. The points will lie on a sequence of spherical shells restricted to the non-negative orthant,
with increasing radii. Specifically, shell N will contain a consecutive subsequence of points, all
with the same magnitude, ℓN . We first make sure that the shells are sufficiently far apart from
each other (i.e. that ℓN − ℓN−1 is sufficiently large) so that the distance between xi on shell N
is large when compared to any xj on shell < N . Specifically, we define ℓN =
1
α
∑N
k=2 ck, where
ck =
1
k log2 k
, and α =
∑∞
k=2 ck. Note crucially that α is finite (by the integral test), and therefore
ℓN is well-defined and bounded above by 1 for all N .
Now for each shell N , we’ll place points with magnitude ℓN starting from angle π/2 and going
down to angle 0 such that within each shell, the points are sufficiently far apart from each other.
Specifically, we’ll place points so that the angles form a geometric progression: the kth point on
shell N will have angle π2 · (1−3δ)k−1, and we’ll stop placing points on shell N once the angle drops
below
√
cN (we’ll determine later exactly what the maximum k is as a function of N).
From here we have two tasks of analysis. First, we must figure out what is gapiδ for some point
xi on shell N . Second, we must figure out how many points we can pack in each shell with the
above construction. We begin by analyzing the gap for a point on shell N with the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let xi be a point on shell N . Then gap
i
δ ∈ Ω(cN ) (recall cN = 1N log2N ).
Proof. In order to evaluate gapiδ for a point in shell N , we’ll compare it to all points xj on a shell
≤ N . Note that technically we don’t need to compare to every point on shell N , but the analysis
is more straightforward this way. For every point xj we also need to find the point xˆi ∈ R−1(xi, δ)
such that gapiδ is minimized.
First, consider xi and the set of points Θi that have the same angle as xi but are on earlier shells.
Then, certainly the point xj in Θi that minimizes xˆi ·(xi−xj) is the one on shellN−1. Furthermore,
the worst possible perturbation for that point is exactly xˆi = xi, since xi has both coordinates
greater than xj . Therefore, the gap between these points is xi(xi − xj) = |xi|2 − |xi||xj | =
ℓ2N − ℓN ℓN−1 = 1αℓN cN ∈ Ω(cN ) (the final relation is because ℓN ≥ 1/4 for all N). Therefore, when
comparing to any xj with the same angle as xi, the gap is indeed Ω(cN ).
Now, consider some xj with a different angle. By construction, for any angle θ such that there
exists a point on a shell ≤ N with angle θ, there also exists a point xj on shell N with angle θ.
Therefore, such a xj inducing the smallest gap is clearly on shell N . Moreover, it will either be the
point immediately clockwise of xi, or immediately counterclockwise (so as the maximize the dot
product and minimize the gap).
Let θi be the angle of xi on the N -th shell, θj be the angle of the xj we’re comparing to (also
on the N -th shell), and θˆi the angle of a point xˆi ∈ R−1(xi, δ). Our plan is to show first that θi
must be far from θj (Claim 1), that θˆi must be close to θi (Claim 2), and finally that conditioned
on these facts, xˆi · (xi − xi−1) must be large (Claim 3).
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Claim 1. |θi − θj | ≥ 3δθi.
Claim 2. |θˆi − θi| ≤ δθi.
Claim 3. Let xi and xj both lie on shell N , and xˆi ∈ R−1(xi, δ). Then xˆi · (xi−xj−1) ≥ 2π2 ℓ2Nδ2θ2i .
Given Claim 3, we simply need to observe that most of these terms are in fact independent of N
(up to constant factors). Specifically, 2δ
2
π2
is obviously independent of N . Moreover, ℓN ∈ (1/4, 1)
for all N . So Claim 3 indeed concludes that xˆi · (xi − xj) ∈ Ω(θ2i ).
This completes the proof of Lemma 3: we have shown that the gap to any point on a lower shell
is Ω(cN ), and the gap to any point on the same shell is Ω(θ
2
i ) = Ω(cN ). The final equality is simply
because our construction stops placing points on shell N once the angle drops below
√
cN .
Now that we’ve computed gapiδ for any point on shell N , we need to compute the number of
points on shell N and then we can analyze
∑
i gap
i
δ.
Lemma 4. The number of points on shell N is Θ(log(1/cN )) = Θ(log(N)).
Proof. Here, we simply need to figure out the largest value of k such that the angle θk ≥ √cN . So
we seek the maximum k such that π/2(1−3δ)k−1 ≥ √cN . Taking logs of both sides and rearranging
yields (note that log(1− 3δ) < 0): k ≤ log(cN )/2−ln(π/2)ln(1−3δ) + 1 ∈ Θ(log(1/cN )) = Θ(log(N)).
We can now complete the proof of Lemma 2. We’ve just shown that our construction has
Θ(logN) points on shell N (Lemma 4), and each such point has gap at least Ω(cN ) (Lemma 3).
This means that: ∑
i
gapiδ ∈ Ω
(∑
N
cN logN
)
= Ω
(∑
N
1
N logN
)
.
∑
N
1
N logN diverges by the integral test, meaning that
∑
i gap
i
δ also diverges.
Theorem 1.1 follows from combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. A technical takeaway from
this section is that the ability to construct bad examples is heavily tied to the ability to pack
points in a sphere “sufficiently far away” from each other. Without any smoothing, it’s possible
to pack infinitely many such points [22], because the points claim none of the region around them.
With rectangle smoothing, the points now claim some of the region around them, and constructions
become trickier, but still exist (note, in particular, that because our choice of angles form a geometric
progression, our sequence of points is heavily concentrated near the x-axis, where the angle is barely
perturbed). On the other hand, in the Square-Shift model, the points now claim a large region
around them and it becomes unclear how to pack so many points. Of course, this is just intuition for
why these specific constructions no longer work; the following sections show that the Square-Shift
model indeed allows for smoothed-finite approximations.
4 Square-Shift Upper Bounds
In this section we present our positive results for the Square-Shift model. We start with a complete
proof in a toy “Angle-Shift” model. This will help us highlight some of the key insights without
the technical barriers. In this model a buyer’s value (x, y) = (r sin θ, r cos θ) is perturbed to a point
(r sin(θ+ε), r cos(θ+ε)), where ε is drawn from U [−δ, δ]. In other words, we output a vector (xˆ, yˆ)
with the same length as (x, y), i.e. x2 + y2 = xˆ2 + yˆ2, whose angle is uniformly distributed in the
interval [max(0, θ−δ),min(π/2, θ+δ)], where θ is the angle of (x, y) (See Figure 1c in Appendix A).
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In Section 4.2 we restate all our results for the Square-Shift model. The proof for a single buyer
and two items can be found in Section 4.3. We present the proof for multiple buyers and two
items in Section 4.4. We include the single buyer, multi-item case in Section 4.5, and the multi-
buyer, multi-item case (with arbitrary correlation across everything) in Section 4.6. Throughout
this section we assume familiarity with polar coordinates. For a brief review, see Appendix D.
4.1 Angle-Shift Upper Bounds
In this section we describe our approach for the Angle-Shift model. We show that for this pertur-
bation model, bundling recovers a fraction of the optimal revenue for a single buyer interested in
two correlated items. This proof highlights some key insights behind Theorem 1.2 without most of
the technical barriers.
Theorem 4.1. For the Two-Dimensional Angle-Shift, Rev(Dˆ) ≤ π2δBRev(Dˆ).
Proof. We break the proof into two big steps. The first step will be almost identical for all our
positive results. In the second step we use model-specific facts.
Step one. We begin by writing the revenue of Dˆ in polar coordinates. Below, g denotes the
density of D in polar coordinates, and gˆ denotes the density of Dˆ in polar coordinates. Recall
that g is not the same as f . We also use the notation g(θ) to denote
∫∞
0 g(w, θ)dw, and g(r|θ)
to denote g(r, θ)/g(θ) (note that g(r|θ) is the density of a one-dimensional distribution, which is
the continuous analog of conditioning on θ). p∗(r, θ) denotes the payment of a buyer with values
(r cos(θ), r sin(θ)) in the optimal mechanism.
Rev(Dˆ) =
∫ π
2
θ=0
∫ ∞
r=0
p∗(r, θ)gˆ(r, θ)drdθ =
∫ π
2
θ=0
gˆ(θ)
∫ ∞
r=0
p∗(r, θ)gˆ(r|θ)drdθ.
Let Dˆθ be the single parameter distribution from which we first sample r according to the
density function gˆ(r|θ), and then output the vector (r cos θ, r sin θ). Then, notice that the inner
most integral is the expected payments according to p∗ for Dˆθ. Observe also that if our optimal
mechanism is truthful on the entire domain R2, it is certainly also truthful on the domain restricted
to θ. Therefore, this expected payment is upper bounded by Rev(Dˆθ), the revenue of the opti-
mal truthful mechanism for the same distribution. Furthermore, since this is a single parameter
distribution, its revenue is equal to the revenue of a posted price auction (with some reserve rθ) [29].
Rev(Dˆ) =
∫ π
2
θ=0
gˆ(θ)
∫ ∞
r=0
p∗(r, θ)gˆ(r|θ)drdθ ≤
∫ π
2
θ=0
gˆ(θ)Rev(Dˆθ)dθ (1)
=
∫ π
2
θ=0
gˆ(θ)
(
rθ
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
sin θ+cos θ
gˆ(r|θ)dr
)
dθ =
∫ π
2
θ=0
rθ
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
sin θ+cos θ
gˆ(r, θ)drdθ.
In going from line one to two above, we are observing that Rev(Dˆθ) integrates the density of
Dˆθ over all r with r(sin θ + cos θ) ≥ rθ. The final step is simply rearranging for convenience later.
This concludes step one, which is simply to upper bound the optimal revenue by an integral over
one-dimensional revenues. Step Two follows, which appeals to the model at hand to unpack gˆ(r, θ).
Step two: model specific analysis. For the Angle-Shift model we have that
gˆ(r, θ) =
∫ min(π/2,θ+δ)
φ=max(0,θ−δ)
g(r, φ)
min(π/2, θ + δ) −max(0, θ − δ)dφ ≤
∫ min(π/2,θ+δ)
φ=max(0,θ−δ)
g(r, φ)
δ
dφ ≤ g(r)
δ
.
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Above, the equality is simply because each (r, φ) when sampled from g sends a Θ(1/δ) fraction of
its density to (r, θ). The first inequality is just observing that the fraction of (r, φ)’s density that
goes to (r, θ) is at most 1/δ (it is exactly 1/δ unless φ is near an axis). The final inequality just
observes that the third term is integrating over a proper subset of possible φ, so the integral is
certainly upper bounded by integrating the entire region from 0 to π/2 (similarly to above, we let
g(r) =
∫ π/2
0 g(r, θ)dθ). This concludes step two, which is simply to use the specifics of the model
to upper bound the density of the smoothed distribution by that of the original distribution.
We combine steps one and two directly to continue our derivation:
Rev(Dˆ) ≤ 1
δ
∫ π
2
θ=0
rθ
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
sin θ+cos θ
g(r)drdθ
≤ 1
δ
∫ π
2
θ=0
rθPr
[
a sample v ∼ D has ‖v‖2 ≥ rθ
sin θ + cos θ
]
dθ
=
1
δ
∫ π
2
θ=0
rθPr
[
a sample v ∼ Dˆ has ‖v‖2 ≥ rθ
sin θ + cos θ
]
dθ
=
1
δ
∫ π
2
θ=0
rθPr
[
a sample v ∼ Dˆ has ‖v‖1 ≥ rθ
]
dθ
≤ 1
δ
∫ π
2
θ=0
BRev(Dˆ)dθ = π
2δ
BRev(Dˆ).
This completes the proof for the Angle-Shift model. Note that above the first inequality simply
combines steps one and two. The second observes that integrating the density of a distribution yields
(one minus) its CDF. The next line observes that the described event occurs with equal probability
for samples from D and Dˆ (this is the step where angle-shifting saves some technical work over
square-shifting). The fourth is basic geometry. The final inequality notes that the expression we
are integrating over is the revenue of a posted-price mechanism for the bundle (specifically, with
reserve rθ) and in particular can be no better than BRev(Dˆ) itself.
Let us now highlight the key step of the proof where we make use of the smoothed model. Step
one applies for any distribution (even unsmoothed), and is in general very loose. In particular,
it could be as high as the full welfare for some distributions. Smoothing gets us mileage in the
first half of step two where we transition from terms that depend on gˆ to terms that depend on
g. Mathematically, we capitalize on the following: if there were no angle-shifting, then we would
simply have had gˆ(r, θ) = g(r, θ) instead of the integral with respect to φ. This is important
because integrals over density functions are probabilities, but density functions themselves are not
probabilities! That is, if we concentrate on the first part of step two, this is claiming that an
integral of a non-negative function over a smaller range is upper bounded by the integral of the
same function over a larger range. Without smoothing, we would instead just have a single point
of that function, which can’t generically be upper bounded by an integral over any region.
4.2 Square-Shift: Our Results
We remind the reader of our results for the Square-Shift model below. Section 4.1 captures the
intuition for one core step which appears in each of the proofs, but in order to prove our main
positive results we still need to overcome a number of technical obstacles.
Theorem 1.2. In the Square-Shift model, for a single additive buyer and 2 items
Rev(Dˆ) ≤
√
2π(1 + δ)3 log (1 + δ)
δ2
BRev(Dˆ) ∈ O
(
1
δ
·BRev(Dˆ)
)
.
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Theorem 4.2. In the Square-Shift model, for n additive buyers and 2 items:
DSICRev(Dˆ) ≤ 9
√
2(1+δ)3 log(1+δ)
δ2
RonenRev(Dˆ) ∈ O(RonenRev(Dˆ)/δ)(if buyers are correlated),
BICRev(Dˆ) ≤ 9
√
2(1+δ)3 log(1+δ)
δ2
RonenRev(Dˆ) ∈ O(RonenRev(Dˆ)/δ)(if buyers are independent).
Theorem 1.3. In the Square-Shift model, for a single additive buyer and m items
Rev(Dˆ) ≤
(√
πe
2
(1 + δ)
δ
)m
(1 + δ) log(1 + δ)m
√
m ·BRev(Dˆ).
Theorem 1.4. For the n additive buyer, m item, Square-Shift model,
Rev(Dˆ) ≤ 4
(√
πe
2
(1 + δ)
δ
)m
(1 + δ) log(1 + δ)m
√
m ·RonenRev(Dˆ),
where Rev(Dˆ) = DSICRev(Dˆ) for correlated buyers, and Rev(Dˆ) = BICRev(Dˆ) for independent
buyers.
4.3 Square-Shift: One buyer, Two Items.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Our first few steps are identical to the Angle-Shift model. Recall that the
first step on the Angle-Shift model was simply to upper bound the optimal multi-dimensional
revenue by that of multiple single-dimensional distributions. We then write the revenue of a single-
dimensional distribution as the revenue of a posted-price.
Rev(Dˆ) =
∫ π/2
θ=0
∫ ∞
r=0
p∗(r, θ)gˆ(r, θ)drdθ =
∫ π/2
θ=0
∫ ∞
r=0
p∗(r, θ)gˆ(θ)gˆ(r|θ)drdθ
≤Lemma 6
∫ π/2
θ=0
gˆ(θ)Rev(Dˆθ)dθ =
∫ π/2
θ=0
gˆ(θ)
(
rθ
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
gˆ(r|θ)dr
)
dθ
=
∫ π/2
θ=0
rθ
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
gˆ(r, θ)drdθ. (2)
We now want to proceed with the analog of the second step: upper bound
∫∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
gˆ(r, θ)dr
in terms of the original distribution. We start by moving from polar coordinates to cartesian
coordinates, using the transformation gˆ(r, θ) = rfˆ(r cos θ, r sin θ). Then, we can connect fˆ , the
density of Dˆ, to f , the density of D, using the following:
fˆ (x, y) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
f(a, b)I{(a, b) ∈ R(x, y)}dadb
δ2max{a, b}2
≤ (1 + δ)
2
δ2max{x, y}2
∫ ∞
a=0
∫ ∞
b=0
f(a, b)I{(a, b) ∈ R(x, y)}dbda,
(3)
where I{(a, b) ∈ R(x, y)} is an indicator for the event that (a, b) belongs in R(x, y). The inequality
follows from the fact that for I{(a, b) ∈ R(x, y)} to be 1 we must have that max{a, b} ≥ max{x,y}1+δ .
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
gˆ(r, θ)dr =
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
rfˆ(r cos θ, r sin θ)dr
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≤ (1 + δ)
2
δ2
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
r
r2max{cos θ, sin θ}2
∫ ∞
a=0
∫ ∞
b=0
f(a, b)I{(a, b) ∈ R(r, θ)}dbdadr
≤ 2(1 + δ)
2
δ2
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
1
r
∫ ∞
a=0
∫ ∞
b=0
f(a, b)I{(a, b) ∈ R(r, θ)}dbdadr.
[
max{cos θ, sin θ}2 ≥ 1
2
]
This is starting to look familiar to the expression we had at the end of step two for Angle-Shift.
The goal of the next few steps is to replace the innermost integral by the integral of the original
density on some controlled region and get rid of the indicator function. At this end of this process,
we hope to get a double integral integral (with respect to a and b) that we can interpret as a
probability. Our first step is to apply Fubini’s Theorem to swap the order of integration:
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
gˆ(r, θ)dr ≤ 2(1 + δ)
2
δ2
∫ ∞
a=0
∫ ∞
b=0
f(a, b)
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
I{(a, b) ∈ R(r, θ)}
r
drdbda.
Now we argue about values of a and b where the indicator I{(a, b) ∈ R(r, θ)} is non-zero.
Claim 4. ∀(a, b) ∈ R(r, θ), if r ≥ rθcos θ+sin θ then a+ b ≥ rθ(1+δ)(cos θ+sin θ) .
Proof. Recall that (a, b) ∈ R(r, θ) means that (a, b) that could map to a point with length r and
angle θ. The length ℓ(a,b) of a point (a, b) that could map to (r, θ) via our perturbing process must
be at least r1+δ . Furthermore, this length ℓ(a,b) is at most a+ b. Combining we get a+ b ≥ ℓ(a,b) ≥
r
1+δ ≥ rθ(1+δ)(cos θ+sin θ) .
We apply Claim 4 to change the limit of integration:
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
gˆ(r, θ)dr ≤
2(1 + δ)2
δ2
∫ ∞
a=0
∫ ∞
b=
rθ
(1+δ)(cos θ+sin θ)
−a
f(a, b)
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
I{(a, b) ∈ R(r, θ)}
r
drdbda.
We can now upper bound the value of the inner most integral.
Claim 5. For the current Square-Shift model, for any (a, b) ∈ R2,∫ ∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
1
r
I{(a, b) ∈ R(r, θ)}dr ≤ log(1 + δ).
Proof. For a fixed angle θ and point (a, b), in order to find out where the indicator is non-zero we
need to find the set of points on the line with slope θ that intersect the set of points to which (a, b)
can map to. The line will first intersect the square defined by (a, b) at some point (x1, y1) with
length ℓ1 (if it ever intersects), and leave the square at some point (x2, y2) with length ℓ2. The
ratio between ℓ1 and ℓ2 is at most (1 + δ):∫ ∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
1
r
I{(a, b) ∈ R(r, θ)}dr ≤
∫ (1+δ)ℓ1
r=ℓ1
1
r
dr.
The claim follows from integrating the simplified upper bound.
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Once the indicator has been dealt with, the remaining upper bound looks similar to that at the
end of step two in the Angle-Shift model. The next couple of lines interpret the double integral as
the probability that the buyer drew a sample whose bundle value was above the reserve price of
that distribution. This is the moral analog of final step in the Angle-Shift model. Applying Claim 5
we have
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
cos θ+sin θ
gˆ(r, θ)dr ≤ 2(1 + δ)
2 log (1 + δ)
δ2
∫ ∞
a=0
∫ ∞
b=
rθ
(1+δ)(cos θ+sin θ)
−a
f(a, b)dbda
=
2(1 + δ)2 log (1 + δ)
δ2
Pr
[
sample from D has sum of values at least rθ
(1 + δ)(cos θ + sin θ)
]
≤ 2(1 + δ)
2 log (1 + δ)
δ2
Pr
[
sample from Dˆ has sum of values at least rθ
(1 + δ)(cos θ + sin θ)
]
,
where we used the fact that perturbing only increases the value for an item.
The remaining step is to combine steps one and two and interpret the right hand side as a
possible bundling mechanism. This can be further upper bounded by the revenue of the optimal
bundling scheme. So plugging back in 2:
Rev(Dˆ) ≤ 2(1 + δ)
2 log (1 + δ)
δ2
∫ π/2
θ=0
rθPr
[
vˆ1 + vˆ2 ≥ rθ
(1 + δ)(cos θ + sin θ)
]
dθ
≤ 2(1 + δ)
2 log (1 + δ)
δ2
∫ π/2
θ=0
rθPr
[
vˆ1 + vˆ2 ≥ rθ
(1 + δ)
√
2
]
dθ
=
2
√
2(1 + δ)3 log (1 + δ)
δ2
∫ π/2
θ=0
rθ
(1 + δ)
√
2
Pr
[
vˆ1 + vˆ2 ≥ rθ
(1 + δ)
√
2
]
dθ.
Claim 6. For any price r, BRev(Dˆ) ≥ rPr [vˆ1 + vˆ2 ≥ r].
Proof. BRev(Dˆ) is the revenue maximizing auction among those that sell both items (with alloca-
tion probability 1) whenever the allocation probability is non-zero. rPr [vˆ1 + vˆ2 ≥ r] is the revenue
of setting a price r for the grand bundle.
Applying Claim 6 completes the proof of Theorem 1.2:
Rev(Dˆ) ≤ 2
√
2(1 + δ)3 log (1 + δ)
δ2
∫ π/2
θ=0
BRev(Dˆ)dθ =
√
2π(1 + δ)3 log (1 + δ)
δ2
BRev(Dˆ).
4.4 Square-Shift: Multiple Buyers, Two Items.
We study the multi-buyer, two-item scenario. The main difference to the single-buyer case is that
interaction between different buyers in optimal auctions (even optimal single-item auctions) can be
very complex. Similar to prior work of [35, 7], the main insight (beyond the single-buyer setting)
here is to make use of Ronen’s auction instead of the optimal auction [31].
Theorem 4.2. In the Square-Shift model, for n additive buyers and 2 items:
DSICRev(Dˆ) ≤ 9
√
2(1+δ)3 log(1+δ)
δ2
RonenRev(Dˆ) ∈ O(RonenRev(Dˆ)/δ)(if buyers are correlated),
BICRev(Dˆ) ≤ 9
√
2(1+δ)3 log(1+δ)
δ2
RonenRev(Dˆ) ∈ O(RonenRev(Dˆ)/δ)(if buyers are independent).
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Proof. The proof is broken into two steps, similarly to the proofs of Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 1.2.
In the first step, we upper bound Rev(Dˆ) by an expression that involves Rev(Dˆθ), where Dˆθ
denotes the n-dimensional distribution r conditioned on angles θ (so below, r denotes the vector
of magnitudes for each buyer, and θ their angles).
DSICRev(Dˆ) =
∫
θ
gˆ(θ)
∫
r
gˆ(r|θ)
n∑
i=1
p∗i (r,θ) drdθ ≤
∫
θ
gˆ(θ)DSICRev(Dˆθ)dθ,
where in the last inequality we used a generalization of Equation 1. See Lemma 6 in Appendix D
for a full re-derivation. Again observe that Dˆθ is now a single-parameter instance.
Main intuition. From here, we wish to mimic the analysis of the previous section. Unfortunately,
optimal multi-buyer mechanisms (even Myerson’s [29]) don’t take a posted-price format, so we
use Ronen’s [31] instead. Fixing angles θ for all buyers, and lengths r−i for all buyers but i,
Ronen’s mechanism (for the possibly correlated, single parameter distribution Dˆθ) makes a take
it or leave it offer r∗i (θ, r−i) to buyer i, which is larger than the value of any other buyer, i.e.
at least maxj 6=i (rj(cos θj + sin θj)). Ronen proved that 2RonenRev(Dˆθ) ≥ DSICRev(Dˆθ); for
independent buyers, 2RonenRev(Dˆθ) ≥ BICRev(Dˆθ) (and this is the only difference between the
correlated and independent buyer proofs).
Let w∗−i(θ−i, r−i) = maxj 6=i (rj(cos θj + sin θj)) be the highest valuation among all buyers
excluding i. Then Ronen’s mechanism gives buyer i the option to purchase the item at price
r∗i (θ, r−i) = argmaxw≥w∗−i(θ−i,r−i) (w · Pr [ri(cos θi + sin θi) ≥ w)]). Using this, we get
DSICRev(Dˆ) ≤ 2
∫
θ
gˆ(θ)
(∫
r
gˆ(r|θ)
n∑
i=1
r∗i (θ, r−i)I{ri(cos θi + sin θi) ≥ r∗i (θ, r−i)}dr
)
dθ
= 2
n∑
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)
∫
θi
r∗i (θ, r−i)
∫ ∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)
cos θi+sin θi
gˆ (ri, θi|r−i,θ−i) dridθidr−idθ−i. (4)
Above, the first line simply replaces DSICRev(Dˆθ) with a formula for the expected revenue of
Ronen’s mechanism. The second line performs a few operations: the inner sum is pulled outside
the integral, some gˆ terms are lumped together for cleanliness, and the integral over an indicator is
replaced by an integral over the region where the indicator is one (and the indicator is dropped).
The brief derivation above captures the main intuition: it’s crucial to upper bound the optimal
revenue as an integral over posted-price revenues. Of course, as we see next, wrapping up the
multi-buyer case has unique subtleties.
The formal argument For simplicity, we write Rev(Dˆ), and don’t separate between correlated
and independent buyers. Recall though, that for independent buyers Rev(Dˆ) = BICRev(Dˆ) and
for correlated buyers, Rev(Dˆ) = DSICRev(Dˆ).
Rev(Dˆ) ≤ 2
∫
θ
gˆ(θ)
(∫
r
gˆ(r|θ)
n∑
i=1
r∗i (θ, r−i)I{ri(cos θi + sin θi) ≥ r∗i (θ, r−i)}dr
)
dθ
= 2
n∑
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)
∫
θi
r∗i (θ, r−i)
∫ ∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)
cos θi+sin θi
gˆ (ri, θi|r−i,θ−i) dridθidr−idθ−i
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= 2
n∑
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)
∫
θi
I{r∗i (θ, r−i) ≤
√
2(1 + δ)w∗i (θ−i, r−i)}r∗i (θ, r−i)∫ ∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)
cos θi+sin θi
gˆ (ri, θi|r−i,θ−i) dridθidr−idθ−i
(5)
+ 2
n∑
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)
∫
θi
I{r∗i (θ, r−i) >
√
2(1 + δ)w∗i (θ−i, r−i)}r∗i (θ, r−i)∫ ∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)
cos θi+sin θi
gˆ (ri, θi|r−i,θ−i) dridθidr−idθ−i.
(6)
Recall that w∗−i(θ−i, r−i) = maxj 6=i (rj(cos θj + sin θj)) (the highest valuation among all buyers
excluding i) and r∗i (θ, r−i) = argmaxw≥w∗−i(θ−i,r−i) (w · Pr [ri(cos θi + sin θi) ≥ w)]).
Bounding 5. We bound 5 by the revenue of a second price auction for the grand bundle. Notice
that replacing r∗i (θ, r−i) with w
∗
i (θ−i, r−i) makes the probability of sale increase, and the price
decreases by a factor of at most 1√
2(1+δ)
:
5 ≤ 2∑ni=1 ∫θ−i,r−i gˆ(r−i,θ−i) ∫θi(1 + δ)w∗i (θ−i, r−i) ∫∞ri=w∗i (θ−i,r−i)cos θi+sin θi gˆ (ri, θi|r−i,θ−i) dridθidr−idθ−i
= 2
√
2(1 + δ)
∑n
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)w∗i (θ−i, r−i)
∫
θi
∫∞
ri=
w∗
i
(θ−i,r−i)
cos θi+sin θi
gˆ (ri, θi|r−i,θ−i) dridθidr−idθ−i
= 2
√
2(1 + δ)SecondPrice(Dˆ) ≤ 2√2(1 + δ)RonenRev(Dˆ),
where SecondPrice(Dˆ) is the optimal revenue that can be attained from using a second price
auction for the grand bundle, i.e. the auction where each buyer bids her value for the grand bundle,
the buyer with the highest bid wins, and the payment is the second highest bid.
Bounding 6. Our approach for bounding 6 will be similar to the single buyer case. Specifically, we
first upper bound the inner most integral, for fixed θ and r−i, by switching to cartesian coordinates,
applying the formula to go from fˆ to f for our perturbed model, changing order of integration
using Fubini’s theorem, and then arguing about the size of the area that gets mapped to the point
(ri cos θi, ri sin θi):
∫∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)
cos θi+sin θi
gˆ (ri, θi|r−i,θ−i) dri =
∫∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)
cos θi+sin θi
rifˆ (ri cos θi, ri sin θi|r−i,θ−i) dri
≤ 2(1+δ)2
δ2
∫∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)
cos θi+sin θi
1
ri
∫∞
a=0
∫∞
b=0 f(a, b|r−i,θ−i)I{(a, b) ∈ R(ri, θi)}dbdadri
≤ 2(1+δ)2
δ2
∫∞
a=0
∫∞
b=0 f(a, b|r−i,θ−i)
∫∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)
cos θi+sin θi
I{(a,b)∈R(ri,θi)}
r drdbda
≤ 2(1+δ)2
δ2
∫∞
a=0
∫∞
b=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)
(1+δ)(cos θi+sin θi)
−a f(a, b|r−i,θ−i)
∫∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)
cos θi+sin θi
I{(a,b)∈R(ri,θi)}
r dridbda
≤ 2(1+δ)2 log (1+δ)
δ2
∫∞
a=0
∫∞
b=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)
(1+δ)(cos θi+sin θi)
−a f(a, b|r−i,θ−i)dbda
= 2(1+δ)
2 log (1+δ)
δ2 Pr
[
x ∼ D has ‖x‖1 ≥ r
∗
i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)(cos θi+sin θi)
| r−i,θ−i
]
≤ 2(1+δ)2 log (1+δ)
δ2
Pr
[
x ∼ Dˆ has ‖x‖1 ≥ r
∗
i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
2
| r−i,θ−i
]
.
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We can now bound 6:
6 ≤ 4(1+δ)2 log (1+δ)δ2
∑n
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)
∫
θi
I{ r∗i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
2
> w∗i (θ−i, r−i)}
r∗i (θ, r−i)Pr
[
xi ∼ Dˆi has ‖xi‖1 ≥ r
∗
i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
2
| r−i,θ−i
]
dθidr−idθ−i
= 4
√
2(1+δ)3 log (1+δ)
δ2
∑n
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)
∫
θi
I{ r∗i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
2
> w∗i (θ−i, r−i)}
r∗i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
2
Pr
[
xi ∼ Dˆi has ‖xi‖1 ≥ r
∗
i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
2
| r−i,θ−i
]
dθidr−idθ−i
≤ 2
√
2π(1+δ)3 log (1+δ)
δ2
∑n
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)I{ r
∗
i (θ−i,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
2
> w∗i (θ−i, r−i)}
r∗i (θ−i,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
2
Pr
[
xi ∼ Dˆi has ‖xi‖1 ≥ r
∗
i (θ−i,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
2
| r−i,θ−i
]
dr−idθ−i,
where the last inequality follows from switching from r∗i (θ, r−i) to r
∗
i (θ−i, r−i) and paying an
additional factor of π/2 (to remove the integral with respect to θi).
Let A be the set of auctions that sells the grand bundle as a whole, and only sells to the
highest bidder. The auction in the RHS offers the grand bundle to buyer i for some price qi,
such that qi ≥ w∗i (θ−i, r−i) (and therefore it sells to at most one buyer), and is an auction in A.
RonenRev(Dˆ) is the revenue maximizing auction in A, therefore:
6 ≤ 2
√
2π(1 + δ)3 log (1 + δ)
δ2
RonenRev(Dˆ).
Putting it all together. Combining our bound for 5 and 6 we get:
Rev(Dˆ) ≤
(
2
√
2(1 + δ) +
2
√
2π(1 + δ)3 log (1 + δ)
δ2
)
RonenRev(Dˆ)
=
2
√
2(1 + δ)
δ2
(
δ2 + π(1 + δ)2 log(1 + δ)
)
RonenRev(Dˆ)
≤ 9
√
2(1 + δ)3 log(1 + δ)
δ2
RonenRev(Dˆ).
4.5 Square-Shift: One buyer, Many Items.
Theorem 1.3. In the Square-Shift model, for a single additive buyer and m items
Rev(Dˆ) ≤
(√
πe
2
(1 + δ)
δ
)m
(1 + δ) log(1 + δ)m
√
m ·BRev(Dˆ).
Proof. Our first few steps are the same. In order to write revenue in polar coordinates we need
m− 1 angles θ = (θ1, . . . , θm−1) and a length r:
Rev(Dˆ) =
∫
θ∈[0,π/2]m−1
∫ ∞
r=0
p∗(r,θ)gˆ(r,θ)drdθ =
∫
θ∈[0,π/2]m−1
∫ ∞
r=0
p∗(r,θ)gˆ(θ)gˆ(r|θ)drdθ
≤Lemma 6
∫
θ∈[0,π/2]m−1
gˆ(θ)Rev(Dˆθ)dθ =
∫
θ∈[0,π/2]m−1
gˆ(θ)

rθ
∫ ∞
r=
rθ∑m
j=1
trigj
gˆ(r|θ)dr

 dθ
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=∫
θ∈[0,π/2]m−1
rθ
∫ ∞
r=
rθ∑m
j=1
trigj
gˆ(r,θ)drdθ. (7)
Next, we bound the integral
∫∞
r=
rθ∑m
j=1
trigj
gˆ(r,θ)dr. Our first step is to go from polar to cartesian
coordinates. This time, the transformation is a bit more complex. More specifically, given a
point (w,φ1, . . . , φm−1) in m dimensions expressed in polar coordinates, the corresponding point
in Cartesian coordinates is x, where xi = w cosφi
∏i−1
j=1 sinφj . The transformation from gˆ to fˆ is
given in Claim 13. Furthermore, we need to upper bound fˆ by f . For the square model the two
are connected by the following equations:
fˆ (xˆ) =
∫
x∈[0,∞]m
f(x)I{x ∈ R(xˆ)}(
δmaxj∈[1,m] xj
)m dx ≤ (1 + δ)m(
δmaxj∈[1,m] xˆj
)m
∫
x∈[0,∞]m
f(x)I{x ∈ R(xˆ)}dx, (8)
where I{x ∈ R(xˆ)} is an indicator for the event that x belongs in R(xˆ). The inequality follows
from the fact that for I{x ∈ R(xˆ)} to be 1 we must have that maxj∈[1,m] xj ≥ maxj∈[1,m] xˆj1+δ .
∫ ∞
r=
r
θ∑m
j=1
trigj
gˆ(r,θ)dr =
∫ ∞
r=
r
θ∑m
j=1
trigj
rm−1
m−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
m−j−1fˆ (r · trig) dr
≤
∫ ∞
r=
r
θ∑m
j=1
trigj
rm−1
m−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
m−j−1·
(
(1 + δ)m(
δrmaxj∈[1,m] trigj
)m
∫
x∈[0,∞]m
f (x) I{x ∈ R(r · trig)}dx
)
dr
≤Cl. 12
(
(1 + δ)
√
m
δ
)m m−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
m−j−1
∫ ∞
r=
rθ∑m
j=1
trigj
∫
x∈[0,∞]m
1
r
f (x) I{x ∈ R (r · trig)}dxdr
=
(
(1 + δ)
√
m
δ
)m m−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
m−j−1
∫
x∈[0,∞]m
f (x)
∫ ∞
r=
rθ∑m
j=1
trigj
1
r
I{x ∈ R (r · trig)}drdx.
Next, we argue about values of x such that the indicator I{x ∈ R (r · trig)} is non-zero.
Claim 7. ∀x ∈ R (r · trig), if r ≥ rθ∑m
j=1 trigj
then
∑m
j=1 xj ≥ rθ(1+δ)(∑mj=1 trigj) .
Proof. Similarly to Claim 4, note that for any vector x ∈ R+m,
∑m
i=1 xi ≥ rx =
√∑
x2i . Moreover,
any vector x that can map to (r,θ) must have its own length, rx be at least
1
1+δ r. Combining these
two claims with that given on the statement completes the proof.
We apply Claim 7 to change the limit of integration:
∫ ∞
r=
r
θ∑m
j=1
trigj
gˆ(r,θ)dr ≤
(
(1 + δ)
√
m
δ
)mm−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
m−j−1·
·
∫
x:‖x‖1≥ rθ(1+δ)(∑m
j=1
trigj )
f (x)
∫ ∞
r=
r
θ∑m
j=1
trigj
1
r
I{x ∈ R (r · trig)}drdx.
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We can now upper bound the value of the inner most integral.
Claim 8. For the current perturbation model, for any ∀x ∈ R (r · trig),∫ ∞
r=
r
θ∑m
j=1
trigj
1
r
I{x ∈ R (r · trig)}dr ≤ log(1 + δ).
Proof. The points that x can map to form a hypercube, and the indicator I{x ∈ R (r · trig)} is
non-zero for a length r, when the point (r,θ) intersects that hypercube. Let rmin be the smallest
length among all points (r,θ) in the hypercube defined by x. Then, the maximum length cannot
be larger than rmin(˙1 + δ). Therefore∫ ∞
r=
r
θ∑m
j=1
trigj
1
r
I{x ∈ R (r · trig)}dr ≤
∫ (1+δ)rmin
r=rmin
1
r
dr.
Integrating the latter integral proves the Claim.
We apply Claim 8 to continue our derivation,
∫ ∞
r=
rθ∑m
j=1
trigj
gˆ(r,θ)dr ≤
(
(1 + δ)
√
m
δ
)m
log(1 + δ)
m−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
m−j−1
∫
x∈[0,∞)m such that
‖x‖1≥ rθ(1+δ)(∑m
j=1
trigj )
f (x) dx
=
(
(1 + δ)
√
m
δ
)m
log(1 + δ)
m−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
m−j−1Pr
[
x ∼ D has ‖x‖1 ≥ rθ
(1 + δ)(
∑m
j=1 trigj)
]
≤
(
(1 + δ)
√
m
δ
)m
log(1 + δ)
m−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
m−j−1Pr
[
x ∼ Dˆ has ‖x‖1 ≥ rθ
(1 + δ)(
∑m
j=1 trigj)
]
≤
(
(1 + δ)
√
m
δ
)m
log(1 + δ)
m−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
m−j−1Pr
[
x ∼ Dˆ has ‖x‖1 ≥ rθ
(1 + δ)
√
m
]
,
where we used the facts that perturbing only increases values, and that
∑m
j=1 trigj ≤
√
m.
Plugging back in Equation 7:
Rev(Dˆ) ≤
∫
θ∈[0,π/2]m−1
rθ·
((1 + δ)√m
δ
)m
log(1 + δ)
m−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
m−j−1Pr
[
sample from Dˆ has ‖x‖1 ≥ rθ
(1 + δ)
√
m
] dθ
≤
(
(1 + δ)
√
m
δ
)m
log(1 + δ)(1 + δ)
√
m
∫
θ∈[0,π/2]m−1
m−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
m−j−1
BRev(Dˆ)dθ
= BRev(Dˆ)
(
(1 + δ)
√
m
δ
)m
(1 + δ) log(1 + δ)
√
m
∫
θ∈[0,π/2]m−1
m−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
m−j−1dθ,
where we used the fact that BRev(Dˆ) is at least r·Pr
[∑m
j=1 xj ≥ r
]
for all r, where (x1, . . . , xm)
is a sample from Dˆ. The next Claim is used to simplify the integral over the product of sine
functions:
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Claim 9. ∫
θ∈[0,π/2]m−1
m−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
m−j−1dθ ≤
(√
πe
2
)m
m
(
√
m)m
.
Proof. We repeatedly use the fact that
∫ π/2
θ=0(sin θ)
kdθ =
√
π
2
Γ( k+12 )
Γ(k2+1)
.
∫ π/2
θ1=0
(sin θ1)
m−2
∫ π/2
θ2=0
(sin θ2)
m−3
∫ π/2
θ3=0
· · ·
∫ π/2
θm−2=0
sin θm−2
(∫ π/2
θm−1=0
1dθm−1
)
dθm−2 . . . dθ1
=
π
2
∫ π/2
θ1=0
(sin θ1)
m−2
∫ π/2
θ2=0
(sin θ2)
m−3
∫ π/2
θ3=0
. . .
(∫ π/2
θm−2=0
sin θm−2dθm−2
)
. . . dθ1
=
π
2
√
π
2
Γ (1)
Γ
(
1
2 + 1
) ∫ π/2
θ1=0
(sin θ1)
m−2
∫ π/2
θ2=0
(sin θ2)
m−3
∫ π/2
θ3=0
. . .
(∫ π/2
θm−3=0
(sin θm−3)2dθm−3
)
. . . dθ1
=
π
2
(√
π
2
)2
Γ (1)
Γ
(
1
2 + 1
) Γ (12 + 1)
Γ (2)
∫ π/2
θ1=0
(sin θ1)
m−2
∫ π/2
θ2=0
. . .
(∫ π/2
θm−4=0
(sin θm−4)3dθm−4
)
. . . dθ1
=
π
2
(√
π
2
)m−2
Γ (1)
Γ
(
m−2
2 + 1
)
=
π
2
(√
π
2
)m−2
1
Γ
(
m
2
) .
Recall that for integer n, Γ(n + 1) = n!, therefore Γ
(
m
2
)
=
(
m
2 − 1
)
!. Using the fact that
k! ≥ (ke )k we get:
π
2
(√
π
2
)m−2
1
Γ
(
m
2
) = π
2
(√
π
2
)m−2
1(
m
2 − 1
)
!
=
π
2
(√
π
2
)m−2 m
2(
m
2
)
!
≤ π
4
(√
π
2
)m−2
m(
m
2e
)m/2
=
(√
π
2
)m
(2e)m/2
m
(
√
m)
m
=
(√
πe
2
)m
m
(
√
m)m
,
which concludes the proof of the Claim.
Applying Claim 9 completes the proof of Theorem 1.3:
Rev(Dˆ) ≤ BRev(Dˆ)
(
(1 + δ)
√
m
δ
)m
(1 + δ) log(1 + δ)
√
m
(√
πe
2
)m
m
(
√
m)m
= BRev(Dˆ)
(√
πe
2
(1 + δ)
δ
)m
(1 + δ) log(1 + δ)m
√
m.
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4.6 Square-Shift: Many buyers, Many Items.
In this section we prove upper bounds for the case of multiple (possibly correlated) buyers and
multiple items, in the Square-Shift model.
Theorem 1.4. For the n additive buyer, m item, Square-Shift model,
Rev(Dˆ) ≤ 4
(√
πe
2
(1 + δ)
δ
)m
(1 + δ) log(1 + δ)m
√
m ·RonenRev(Dˆ),
where Rev(Dˆ) = DSICRev(Dˆ) for correlated buyers, and Rev(Dˆ) = BICRev(Dˆ) for independent
buyers.
Proof. We write θ for the vector (θ1, . . . ,θn), where θi = (θi,1, . . . , θi,m−1) is the vector of angles
for buyer i:
Rev(Dˆ) =
∫
θ
gˆ(θ)
∫
r
gˆ(r|θ)
n∑
i=1
p∗i (r,θ) drdθ ≤
∫
θ
gˆ(θ)Rev(Dˆθ)dθ,
where Dˆθ is a correlated, single parameter distribution where we draw a value vector r =
(r1, . . . , rn) according to the density function gˆ(r|r−iθ), and give each buyer i value ri · trigk(θi)
for item k. Ronen’s mechanism [31] for this distribution makes a take it or leave it offer r∗i (θ, r−i)
to buyer i for the grand bundle; r∗i (θ, r−i) is larger than the value of any other buyer, i.e. at
least maxj 6=i (rj
∑m
k=1 trigk(θj)). This mechanism is a 2 approximation to the optimal mechanism
for Dˆθ. Let w∗−i(θ−i, r−i) = maxj 6=i (rj
∑m
k=1 trigk(θj)) be the second highest valuation among all
buyers excluding i, and r∗i (θ, r−i) = argmaxw≥w∗−i(θ−i,r−i) (w · Pr [ri
∑m
k=1 trigk(θi) ≥ w)]) be the
price offered by Ronen’s mechanism.
Rev(Dˆ) ≤ 2 ∫
θ
gˆ(θ)
(∫
r
gˆ(r|θ)∑ni=1 r∗i (θ, r−i)I{ri∑mk=1 trigk(θi) ≥ r∗i (θ, r−i)}dr) dθ
= 2
∑n
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)
∫
θi
r∗i (θ, r−i)
∫∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)∑m
k=1
trigk(θi)
gˆ (ri,θi|r−i,θ−i) dridθidr−idθ−i (9)
= 2
∑n
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)
∫
θi
I{r∗i (θ, r−i) ≤
√
m(1 + δ)w∗i (θ−i, r−i)}r∗i (θ, r−i)∫∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)∑m
k=1
trigk(θi)
gˆ (ri,θi|r−i,θ−i) dridθidr−idθ−i (10)
+ 2
∑n
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)
∫
θi
I{r∗i (θ, r−i) >
√
m(1 + δ)w∗i (θ−i, r−i)}r∗i (θ, r−i)∫∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)∑m
k=1
trigk(θi)
gˆ (ri,θi|r−i,θ−i) dridθidr−idθ−i. (11)
Similarly to the two item case, bounding 9 is problematic. To go around the issue we separate 9
cases depending on whether r∗i (θ, r−i) is almost the second highest value, or at least
√
m(1 + δ)
times the second highest value. We get terms 10 and 11 which we bound separately.
Bounding 10. We bound 10 by the revenue of a second price auction for the grand bundle.
Notice that replacing r∗i (θ, r−i) with w
∗
i (θ−i, r−i) makes the probability of sale increase, and the
price decreases by a factor of at most 1√
m(1+δ)
:
10 ≤ 2∑ni=1 ∫θ−i,r−i gˆ(r−i,θ−i) ∫θi(1 + δ)w∗i (θ−i, r−i)
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∫∞
ri=
w∗
i
(θ−i,r−i)∑m
k=1
trigk(θi)
gˆ (ri,θi|r−i,θ−i) dridθidr−idθ−i
= 2
√
m(1 + δ)
∑n
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)w∗i (θ−i, r−i)∫
θi
∫∞
ri=
w∗
i
(θ−i,r−i)∑m
k=1
trigk(θi)
gˆ (ri,θi|r−i,θ−i) dridθidr−idθ−i
= 2
√
m(1 + δ)SecondPrice(Dˆ) ≤ 2√m(1 + δ)RonenRev(Dˆ).
Bounding 11. Our approach for bounding 11 will be similar to the single buyer case. Specifi-
cally, we first upper bound the inner most integral, for fixed θ and r−i, by switching to cartesian
coordinates, applying the formula to go from fˆ to f for our perturbation model, changing order of
integration using Fubini’s theorem, and then arguing about the size of the area that gets mapped
to the point ri
∑m
k=1 trigk(θi).
∫∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)∑m
k=1
trigk(θi)
gˆ (ri,θi|r−i,θ−i) dri
=
∫∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)∑m
k=1
trigk(θi)
rm−1i
∏m−2
k=1 (sin θi,k)
m−k−1fˆ (ri
∑m
k=1 trigk(θi)|r−i,θ−i) dri
≤
(
(1+δ)
√
m
δ
)m∏m−2
k=1 (sin θi,k)
m−k−1 ∫∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)∑m
k=1
trigk(θi)
1
ri
∫
x
f(x|r−i,θ−i)I{x ∈ R(ri,θi)}dxdri
≤
(
(1+δ)
√
m
δ
)m∏m−2
k=1 (sin θi,k)
m−k−1 ∫
x
f(x|r−i,θ−i)
∫∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)∑m
k=1
trigk(θi)
I{x∈R(ri,θi)}
ri
dridx
≤
(
(1+δ)
√
m
δ
)m∏m−2
k=1 (sin θi,k)
m−k−1
∫
x:‖x‖≥ r
∗
i
(θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
∑m
k=1
trigk(θi)
f(x|r−i,θ−i)
∫∞
ri=
r∗
i
(θ,r−i)∑m
k=1
trigk(θi)
I{x∈R(ri,θi)}
ri
dridx
≤
(
(1+δ)
√
m
δ
)m∏m−2
k=1 (sin θi,k)
m−k−1 log(1 + δ)
∫
x:‖x‖≥ r
∗
i
(θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
∑m
k=1
trigk(θi)
f(x|r−i,θ−i)
≤
(
(1+δ)
√
m
δ
)m∏m−2
k=1 (sin θi,k)
m−k−1 log(1 + δ)Pr
[
x ∼ D has ‖x‖1 ≥ r
∗
i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
∑m
k=1 trigk(θi)
| r−i,θ−i
]
≤
(
(1+δ)
√
m
δ
)m∏m−2
k=1 (sin θi,k)
m−k−1 log(1 + δ)Pr
[
x ∼ Dˆ has ‖x‖1 ≥ r
∗
i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
m
| r−i,θ−i
]
.
We can now bound 11:
11 ≤ 2
(
(1+δ)
√
m
δ
)m
log(1 + δ)
∑n
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)
∫
θi
∏m−2
k=1 (sin θi,k)
m−k−1
I{ r∗i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
m
> w∗i (θ−i, r−i)}r∗i (θ, r−i)Pr
[
x ∼ Dˆ has ‖x‖1 ≥ r
∗
i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
m
| r−i,θ−i
]
dθiθ−ir−i
= 2
√
m(1 + δ)
(
(1+δ)
√
m
δ
)m
log(1 + δ)
∑n
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)
∫
θi
∏m−2
k=1 (sin θi,k)
m−k−1
I{ r∗i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
m
> w∗i (θ−i, r−i)} r
∗
i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
m
Pr
[
x ∼ Dˆ has ‖x‖1 ≥ r
∗
i (θ,r−i)
(1+δ)
√
m
| r−i,θ−i
]
dθiθ−ir−i
= 2
√
m(1 + δ)
(
(1+δ)
√
m
δ
)m
log(1 + δ)
∑n
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)
∫
θi
∏m−2
k=1 (sin θi,k)
m−k−1
I{q∗i (θ, r−i) > w∗i (θ−i, r−i)}q∗i (θ, r−i)Pr
[
x ∼ Dˆ : ‖x‖1 ≥ q∗i (θ, r−i) | r−i,θ−i
]
dθiθ−ir−i
≤ 2√m(1 + δ)
(
(1+δ)
√
m
δ
)m
log(1 + δ)
∑n
i=1
∫
θ−i,r−i
gˆ(r−i,θ−i)
∫
θi
∏m−2
k=1 (sin θi,k)
m−k−1
I{q∗i (θ−i, r−i) > w∗i (θ−i, r−i)}q∗i (θ−i, r−i)Pr
[
x ∼ Dˆ : ‖x‖1 ≥ q∗i (θ−i, r−i) | r−i,θ−i
]
dθiθ−ir−i
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≤ 2√m(1 + δ)
(
(1+δ)
√
m
δ
)m
log(1 + δ) ·
((√
πe
2
)m m
(
√
m)m
)
·RonenRev(Dˆ)
= 2
(√
πe
2
(1+δ)
δ
)m
(1 + δ) log(1 + δ)m
√
m ·RonenRev(Dˆ).
Putting it all together. Combining our bound for 10 and 11 we get:
Rev(Dˆ) ≤ 4
(√
πe
2
(1 + δ)
δ
)m
(1 + δ) log(1 + δ)m
√
m ·RonenRev(Dˆ).
5 Extensions
It is straightforward to extend our results beyond additive valuations.
Unit-Demand Valuations
Our bounds for unit-demand valuations are the same as the ones for additive valuations, in both
the Angle-Shift and the Square-Shift models. Starting from our toy Angle-Shift model, notice that
in the proof of Theorem 4.1 Lemma 6 can still be applied, but Dˆθ can be replaced by the single
parameter distribution where we sample r as before and output max{r cos θ, r sin θ} (instead of
r(cos θ + sin θ)). This would give a term
∫∞
r=
rθ
max{sin θ,cos θ}
g(r)dr, which is equal to the probability
that a sample from D has length at least rθmax{sin θ,cos θ} , which is equal to the probability of the
same event for Dˆ, which is equal to Pr
[
(x, y) ∼ Dˆ has max{x, y} ≥ rθ
]
. The latter probability
multiplied by rθ is upper bounded by BRev(Dˆ). Therefore, for this setting, we overall get the
same bound of π
√
2
2δ BRev(Dˆ) for unit-demand valuations.
In the Square-Shift model, starting from a single buyer and two items, the same observation
about Dˆθ holds. When bounding
∫∞
rmax{cos θ,sin θ}=rθ gˆ(r, θ)dr, Claim 4 is replaced by:
Claim 10. ∀(a, b) ∈ R(r, θ), if r ≥ rθmax{cos θ,sin θ} then max{a, b} ≥ rθ1+δ .
Proof. Recall that (a, b) ∈ R(r, θ) means that (a, b) that could map to a point with length r and
angle θ. Then, (1 + δ)max{a, b} ≥ max{r cos θ, r sin θ} ≥ rθ. The Claim follows.
Claim 5 remains unchanged. Overall we get:
∫ ∞
r=
rθ
max{cos θ,sin θ}
gˆ(r, θ)dr ≤ 2(1 + δ)
2 log (1 + δ)
δ2
∫ ∞
a=0
∫ ∞
b=
rθ
1+δ
−a
f(a, b)dbda
=
2(1 + δ)2 log (1 + δ)
δ2
Pr
[
sample from D has maximum value at least rθ
1 + δ
]
≤ 2(1 + δ)
2 log (1 + δ)
δ2
Pr
[
sample from Dˆ has maximum value at least rθ
1 + δ
]
.
Therefore, the bound Rev(Dˆ) ≤
√
2π(1+δ)3 log (1+δ)
δ2
BRev(Dˆ) is valid a unit demand buyer and
two items in the Square-Shift model. For a single buyer and m items we reach the same conclusion
by replacing Claim 7 appropriately. Similarly for the many buyer case two item, and many buyer
multi-item cases: 5 is bounded by a second price auction for the grand bundle (where this time
buyer i’s value for the grand bundle is max{vi,1, vi,2} and not vi,1 + vi,2), and the second term (6)
is bounded similarly to the single buyer case.
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Additive subject to downward-closed constraints I
Let Rev(D) be the revenue of the optimal truthful mechanism on an m-dimensional, n (corre-
lated) buyer distribution D, where the utility of buyer i for a subset of the items S is equal
vi(S) = maxT⊆S,T∈I{
∑
j∈T vi,j}. Also, let AdditiveRev(D) be the optimal revenue of the same
distribution, but this time buyers have additive valuation functions.
Claim 11. Rev(D) ≤ AdditiveRev(D).
Therefore, we can apply our approximations for the additive setting. It remains to observe that
the revenue of bundling under additive valuations is at most m times the revenue of bundling under
downward-closed constraints I, i.e. we lose a factor m in the approximation guarantee.
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
We initiate the smoothed analysis of multi-item auctions with arbitrarily correlated buyers. We
present two main results: first, the [5, 22] construction is surprisingly robust, and the infinite gap
persists in our “Rectangle-Shift” model. Second, we show that a smoothed-finite approximation
is indeed possible in our “Square-Shift” model, with extensions to multiple buyers and multiple
items. As a bonus technical insight, we learn that whether or not an infinite gap exists between
simple and optimal for some distribution D is intimately connected to what D looks like in small
cones.
Our work takes the view of studying truly simple mechanisms whose approximation ratios
degrade with the smoothing parameter. An alternative approach would be to study truly good
approximation ratios via mechanisms whose complexity degrades with the smoothing parameter.
To be a little more concrete, an interesting open question is the following: in the Square-Shift model,
what is the required menu complexity of an auction (that is, the number of possible outcomes based
on the buyers’ input) to guarantee a (1− ε)-approximation if Dˆ is smoothed with parameter δ?
A general direction for future work is exploring alternative smoothed models. As an example,
for many items our guarantees are exponential in m, and this is tight for our model. Would
an alternative natural smoothed model provide an improved guarantee, or is there some inherent
barrier?
The “independent items” paradigm led to numerous developments which deepened our under-
standing of multi-item auctions. This work shows that smoothed analysis can help guide future
work to better understand worst-case distributions beyond the impossibility results of [5, 22].
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A Results and Figures
Independent Correlated Square-Shift
n = 1,m = 2 Rev(D)
BRev(D) ≤ 2 [21]
Rev(D)
BRev(D) unbounded [22]
Rev(Dˆ)
BRev(Dˆ) ≤
√
2π(1+δ)3 log (1+δ)
δ2
n = 1, general m Rev(D)max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≤ 6 [2] 2
m
m ≤ Rev(Dˆ)BRev(Dˆ) ≤
(√
πe
2
(1+δ)
δ
)m
(1 + δ) log(1 + δ)m
√
m
general n, m = 2 DSICRev(D)
SRev(D) ∈ O(1) [2, 35] DSICRev(Dˆ)RonenRev(Dˆ) ≤
9
√
2(1+δ)3 log(1+δ)
δ2
general n,m BICRev(D)max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≤ 8 [35, 7] DSICRev(Dˆ)RonenRev(Dˆ) ∈ O
(
(1+δ)
δ
)m
(1 + δ) log(1 + δ)m
√
m
(x, y) δx
δy
(a) Rectangle-Shift.
(x, y) δx
δx
(b) Square-Shift.
(r, θ)
r
θ
(r, θ + δ)
(r, θ − δ)
(c) Angle-Shift
Figure 1: Our models.
B Extended Preliminaries
For the sake of completion, we provide a brief discussion on the BIC solution concept for correlated
buyers. Note that when buyers are correlated, your prior on the other buyers’ values changes
depending on your own prior. So Bayesian IC truly means “you prefer to tell the truth, assuming
that all other buyers tell the truth (even taking your updated prior into account).” Formally,
one needs to define πij(vi,v
′
i) to be the probability that buyer i receives item j conditioned on
reporting vi while their true type is v
′
i. When buyers are independent the true type doesn’t affect
the conditioning. And then a mechanism is BIC as long as:
vi · ~πi(vi,vi)− pi(vi) ≥ vi · πi(vi,v′i)− pi(v′i).
Also, while the difference between ex-post IR (always receive non-negative utility for reporting
the truth) and interim IR (receive non-negative utility for reporting the truth in expectation) is
unimportant for auctions with independent buyers (due to a very simple reduction from interim IR
to ex-post IR, see e.g. [15]). There’s a fundamental difference for correlated buyers. This is because
seminal work of Cremer and McLean [14] shows that for any non-generic correlated distribution, it
is possible for the seller to extract the full welfare with a DSIC, interim IR mechanism (but this is
not possible with a DSIC, ex-post IR mechanism). So all of our results stated for correlated buyers
necessarily reference ex-post IR mechanisms (and this is explicitly stated in the body).
C Lower bounds
C.1 Rectangle-Shift lower bounds
Proof of Lemma 1. Let Mi =
4i
∏
j<i gap
j
δ
. Let D be the following distribution: the buyer has value
vi =Mixi with probability
1
Mi
. With the remaining probability 1−∑∞i=1Mi the value is zero. We
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sample from Dˆ by first sampling xi w.p. 1Mi , perturbing with parameter δ to xˆi, and outputting
value v =Mixˆi.
Consider the following menu. The i-th menu item costs Migap
i
δ for an allocation of xi. We first
show that every buyer xˆi ∈ R−1(xi, δ) prefers the i-th menu item. First, notice that the utility of
such a buyer for the i-th item is Mixˆixi −Migapiδ ≥ Mixˆixj , for all j < i (from the definition of
gapiδ), which is the utility from getting j-th menu item without any payment. For j > i, the utility
of buyer xˆi for the j-th menu item is: Mixˆixj −Mjgapjδ ≤ 2(1+ δ)Mi− 4Mj−1 < 0, since j− 1 ≥ i
and δ < 1/2. Finally, the revenue of this auction is
∑∞
i=1Migap
i
δ
1
Mi
=
∑∞
i=1 gap
i
δ.
It remains to show that BRev(Dˆ) ∈ O(1). For any point xˆi, the buyer’s value (and seller’s
revenue) for the grand bundle is at most 2Mi(1 + δ) (post perturbing). Since 2Mi−1(1 + δ) < Mi,
the only types willing to buy the bundle at price Mixˆi are those j ≥ i. Then the probability of
selling is at most
∑
j≥i
1
Mi
≤ 2Mi (since the series of Mi is dominated by a geometric sequence with
rate of growth of 2). Therefore the revenue of selling the grand bundle at any price Mixˆi is at most
2
Mi
2Mi(1 + δ) = 4(1 + δ).
Proof of Claim 1. Recall that the kth point on shell N has angle π2 · (1− 3δ)k−1. Observe that for
any j > k, we have θj = (1−3δ)j−k ·θk ≤ (1−3δ)θk . In particular, this implies that θk−θj ≥ 3δθk.
For the other direction, if j < k, we have just shown that |θk − θj| ≥ 3δθj ≥ 3δθk, since θk is a
decreasing sequence.
Proof of Claim 2. The most extreme angles θˆi a point pi can be mapped to are arctan(tan(θi(1+δ)))
and arctan(tan( θi1+δ )). We now bound how big the gap can be, as a function of θi. We do so by
examining the integral of the derivative of the function arctan((1 + x) tan(θi)) with respect to x.
θˆi − θi ≤ arctan((1 + δ) tan(θi))− arctan (tan (θi))
≤
∫ x=δ
x=0
tan(θi)
(tan(θi) + x tan(θi))2 + 1
dx
≤ δ tan(θi)
tan(θi)2 + 1
= δ sin θi cos θi ≤ δθi.
Similarly, we have (by examining the function arctan((1 + x) tan(θi)/(1 + δ)):
θi − θˆi ≤ arctan(tan(θi))− arctan (tan (θi) /(1 + δ))
≤
∫ x=δ
x=0
tan(θi)/(1 + δ)
( tan(θi)+x tan(θi)1+δ )
2 + 1
dx
≤ δ (1 + δ) tan(θi)
tan(θi)2 + (1 + δ)2
≤ δ (1 + δ) sin θi cos θi
1 + (2δ − δ2) cos2 θi ≤ δ
θi + δθi cos
2 θi
1 + δ cos2 θi
= δθi.
The final line is due to the fact that θi ≥ sin θi cos θi on [0, π/2], and also that θi cos θi ≥ sin θi
on [0, π/2] (and that 2δ − δ2 ≥ δ).
Proof of Claim 3.
xˆi (xi − xj) = ‖xˆi‖‖xi‖ cos
(
θi − θˆi
)
− ‖xˆi‖‖xj‖ cos
(
θˆi − θj
)
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= ‖xˆi‖ℓN cos
(
θi − θˆi
)
− ‖xˆi‖ℓN cos
(
θˆi − θj
)
≥ ℓ2N
(
cos
(
θi − θˆi
)
− cos
(
θˆi − θj
))
[‖xˆi‖ ≥ ℓN ]
= ℓ2N
(
2 sin
( |θi−θj |
2
)
sin
( |2θˆi−θi−θj |
2
)) [
cos x− cos y = 2 sin y+x2 sin y−x2 , sinx = sin |x|
]
≥ 2
π2
ℓ2N (|θi − θj |)
(
|2θˆi − 2θi + θi − θj|
) [
Jordan’s inequality: sinx ≥ 2πx
]
≥ 2π2 ℓ2N
(
|θi − θj | − 2|θˆi − θi|
)2
≥ 2π2 ℓ2n (3δθi − 2δθi)2 . [Claims 2 and 1 ]
C.2 Square-Shift Lower Bound for Two Items
Lemma 5. There exists a bivariate distribution D such that for its corresponding perturbed distri-
bution Dˆ, Rev(Dˆ) ∈ Ω ((1δ )1/7)BRev(Dˆ).
Proof. First, we restate some known results that we will need.7
Let q1, q2, . . . be a finite or countably infinite sequence of points in [0, 1]k. Define
gapn = qn · qn −max
j<n
qj · qn.
Proposition 1 (Proposition 5.1 in [22]). For every (finite or countably infinite) sequence q1, q2, . . .
of points in [0, 1]k there exists a distribution F on Rk+ such that BRev(F ) ≤ 2k, Rev(F ) ≥
∑
n gap
n
and E[v1 + v2] =
∑
n ‖qn‖1. Specifically, for each n, let Mn = (2k)n/(
∏n
j=1 gap
j). Then, F is the
distribution that puts probability 1/Mn on the point xn =Mnqn, and puts the remaining probability
on the point 0.
Proposition 2 (Proposition 6.1 in [22]). There exists an infinite sequence of points q1, q2, . . . of
points in [0, 1]2 with ‖qk‖2 ≤ 1, such that taking for all k, gapk ∈ Ω(k−6/7). The construction puts
points in “shells”. The N -th shell has N3/4 points with length
∑N
ℓ=1 ℓ
−3/2/(
∑∞
ℓ=1 ℓ
−3/2).
Combining these two results we can get a distribution D over n points, such that BRev(D) ≤ 4
and Rev(D) ≥ ∑nk=1 gapk = ∑nk=1 k−6/7 ∈ Ω(n1/7). The largest possible value for any of the
two items is Mnqn ≤ 2Mn ≤ 2 4n∏n
j=1 gap
j ≤ 4n+1. The expected welfare of D is
∑n
k=1 ‖qk‖1 ∈
Θ(
∑n
k=1 ‖qk‖2) = Θ(
∑Nmax
N=1 N
3/4
∑N
ℓ=1 ℓ
−3/2
∑∞
ℓ=1 ℓ
−3/2 ) = Θ(N
7/4
max), where Nmax is the number of shells. The
total number of points is n, and the N -th shell has N3/4 points, therefore, Nmax ∈ Θ(n4/7), and
therefore the expected welfare is in Θ(n).
To complete the proof of the lemma, we find a δ that is large, but at the same time the gap
between Rev(Dˆ) and BRev(Dˆ) remains sufficiently large as well. We use the following theorem:
Theorem 1 ([32]). Let D be a distribution, and D+ be a distribution that stochastically dominates
D. Let ∆ denote the random function v+− v, when couples v+ and v are sampled jointly from D+
and D. Finally, let Val(∆) be the expected welfare of VCG with buyers whose types are distributed
according to ∆. Then, for all such D, D+, ∆, and for every mechanism M for D and every ǫ > 0,
there exists a mechanism M ′ for D+ such that
Rev(M ′,D+) ≥ (1− ǫ) ·
(
Rev(M,D)− Val(∆)
ǫ
)
.
7These propositions appear in the arXiv version of [22] uploaded on 22 April, 2013.
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We apply this theorem for D = D, and D+ = Dˆ, which stochastically dominates D, and M the
optimal mechanism for D. Observe that Val(∆) = E[∑2i=1(vˆi−vi)] ≤ 2δE[maxi vi] ≤ 2δE[v1+v2] ∈
Θ(δn). We set ǫ = 12 . Then:
Rev(Dˆ) ≥ Rev(M ′, Dˆ)
≥ 1
2
· (Rev(D)−Θ(δn))
≥ n
1/7
2
−Θ(δn).
Picking n ∈ Θ(1δ ) gives Rev(Dˆ) ∈ Ω(n1/7), while BRev(Dˆ) ≤ BRev(D) + δn ∈ O(1).
C.3 Square-Shift Lower Bound for Multiple Items
In this subsection we present a lower bound for the Square-Shift model with a single buyer interested
in multiple items.
Theorem C.1. For small enough δ, there exists a distribution overm items D such that BRev(Dˆ) ∈
O(m2) but Rev(Dˆ) ∈ Ω (m2m).
Proof. Enumerate all subsets of [m] of size m2 in some order: S1, S2, ..., SM , M =
( m
m/2
)
, and let
C =
∑M
j=1m
−2j = 1
m2−1 . For D, the buyer will have type j with probability m−2j/C. A buyer of
type j is interested in each item in Sj equally, for a value of 2m
2j per item, and is not interested
in items not in Sj.
The valuations in Dˆ are not significantly different. The buyer with type j has a value of at
most δ2mj for an item not in Sj and (1 + δ)2m
2j for an item in Sj . This means that for the
buyer’s value for the grand bundle is at most m2 δ2m
2j + m2 (1 + δ)2m
2j ≤ m2j+1(1 + 2δ), which is
smaller than 2m2(j+1). Therefore, if the grand bundle is priced at 2m2j , only buyers with types
k ≥ j will purchase. Therefore, the revenue of bundling is BRev(Dˆ) ≤ (1 + 2δ)2m2j∑ki≥j m−2iC ≤
4(1 + 2δ) 1C ∈ O(m2).
Consider the following mechanism. Offer the set Sj at a price m
2j . We show that a buyer with
type j always prefers that tailored offer to any other subset. For k > j, the cost of Sk is at least
m2j+2. The value of j for Sj is at most
m
2 2m
2j(1 + δ) = m2j+1(1 + δ), which is less than the cost
of Sk for k > j. For k < j, the utility of a type j for getting Sk for free is at most Vk =
∑m−1
i=1 vˆi,
where vˆi is the value for the i-th valuable item after perturbing. The utility of j for Sj is at least∑m−1
i=1 vˆi + 2m
2j −m2j = Vk +m2j . Therefore, type j purchases Sk for a price of m2j. The total
revenue is
∑k
j=1m
2j m−2j
C =
k
C ≥ m2m.
D Upper Bounds
Polar Coordinates
It will turn out extremely useful for our analysis to look at valuations in polar coordinates as
opposed to Cartesian coordinates. We use this space to remind the reader about some useful
properties. Given a m-dimensional vector x, its polar transformation is (r,θ), where r is a non-
negative real number and θ is an m − 1 dimensional vector of angles θi ∈ [0, π2 ] such that x1 =
r cos θ1, x2 = r sin θ1 cos θ2, x3 = r sin θ1 sin θ2 cos θ3 and so on until xm−1 = r
∏m−2
k=1 sin θk cos θm−1,
xm = r
∏m
k=1 sin θk. Let trig (θ) be a vector such that trigj (θ) = cos θj
∏j−1
k=1 sin θk. We sometimes
write (r · trig (θ)) or (r, trig (θ)) for the transformation from polar to cartesian coordinates.
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Claim 12. maxj=1,...,m (trigj(θ)) ≥ 1√m .
Proof.
∑m
j=1 trig(θ)
2
j = 1 and therefore the largest entry (of the sum) must be greater than their
average, 1/m. Since the entries are non-negative we can take a square root; the Claim follows.
Let gi and gˆi be the densities of Di and Dˆi in polar coordinates. Claim 13 is a well-known
consequence of multi-variable calculus.
Claim 13. Let x ∈ R+m and let (r,θ) be its polar transform. For any probability density f(x)
defined on x ∈ R+m, the corresponding density in polar coordinates is given by g(r,θ) = Jmf(x),
where Jm = r
m−1∏m−2
i=1 sin(θi)
m−1−j . In particular J2 = r, J3 = r2 sin θ1 and so on.
We use the following Lemma in all our upper bounds; it’s a generalization of the fixed angle
upper bound in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 6. For any pricing p, for any angles θ1, . . . ,θn , where θi = (θi,1, . . . , θi,m−1),∫
r∈[0,∞)n gˆ(r|θ1, . . . ,θn)
∑n
i=1 p
∗
i (r,θ1, . . . ,θn)dr ≤ Rev(Dˆθ1 , . . . , Dˆθn),
where Dˆθi is the single parameter distribution of buyer i (perhaps correlated with the distribution of
another buyer j), where a length vector r is drawn according to the density function gˆ(r|θ1, . . . ,θn),
and Rev(Dˆθ) is the revenue of the optimal auction that is truthful in the same sense as p∗.
Proof. The LHS is the revenue of p conditioned on the angles being θ, i.e. the revenue of p for the
distribution where we draw r according to gˆ (r|θ), and buyer i has value ritrigj(θi) for item j. The
RHS is the maximum revenue that a truthful auction can extract from the same distribution.
E Additive noise
We provide almost matching upper and lower bounds for the model where D is supported on
[0, vmax]
2 and we perturb v by adding a uniformly random vector from [0, δvmax]
2.
Lemma 7. Rev(Dˆ) ∈ O(ln(1/δ))BRev(Dˆ)
Proof. Observe that for any Dˆ, and any x ≥ BRev(Dˆ), we have that Pr[vˆ1 + vˆ2 ≥ x] ≤ BRev(Dˆ)x .
Otherwise, if there exists x∗ ≥ BRev(Dˆ) such that Pr[vˆ1 + vˆ2 ≥ x∗] > BRev(Dˆ)x∗ , setting a posted
price of x∗ for the grand bundle would yield strictly more revenue than BRev(Dˆ); a contradiction.
E[vˆ1 + vˆ2] =
∫ 2
x=0
Pr[vˆ1 + vˆ2 ≥ x]dx
=
∫
BRev(Dˆ)
x=0
Pr[vˆ1 + vˆ2 ≥ x]dx+
∫ 2
x=BRev(Dˆ)
Pr[vˆ1 + vˆ2 ≥ x]dx
≤ BRev(Dˆ) +
∫ 2
x=BRev(Dˆ)
BRev(Dˆ)
x
dx
= BRev(Dˆ) +BRev(Dˆ) ln
(
2
BRev(Dˆ)
)
,
which immediately implies that Rev(Dˆ) ≤ BRev(Dˆ) + BRev(Dˆ) ln
(
2
BRev(Dˆ)
)
. Furthermore,
BRev(Dˆ) ≥ δ, by simply selling the grand bundle for a price of δ. The lemma follows.
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Lemma 8. There exists a bivariate distribution D such that for its corresponding perturbed distri-
bution Dˆ, Rev(Dˆ) ∈ Ω (ln(1δ )1/7)BRev(Dˆ).
Proof. First, we restate some known results that we will need.8
Let q1, q2, . . . be a finite or countably infinite sequence of points in [0, 1]k. Define
gapn = qn · qn −max
j<n
qj · qn.
Proposition 3 (Proposition 5.1 in [22]). For every (finite or countably infinite) sequence q1, q2, . . .
of points in [0, 1]k there exists a distribution F on Rk+ such that BRev(F ) ≤ 2k, and Rev(F ) ≥∑
n gap
n. Specifically, for each n, let Mn = (2k)n/(
∏n
j=1 gap
j). Then, F is the distribution that
puts probability 1/Mn on the point xn =Mnqn, and puts the remaining probability on the point 0.
Proposition 4 (Proposition 6.1 in [22]). There exists an infinite sequence of points q1, q2, . . . of
points in [0, 1]2 with ‖qk‖2 ≤ 1, such that taking for all k, gapk ∈ Ω(k−6/7).
Combining these two results we can get a distribution D over n points in [0, 1]2, such that
BRev(D) ≤ 4 and Rev(D) ≥∑nk=1 gapk =∑nk=1 k−6/7 ∈ Ω(n1/7). The largest possible value for
any of the two items is Mnqn ≤ 2Mn ≤ 2 4n∏n
j=1 gap
j ≤ 4n+1.
Let D be D/4n+1. Then, BRev(D) ≤ 4−n and Rev(D) ∈ Ω(n1/7/4n). To complete the proof of
the lemma, we find a δ that is large, but at the same time the gap between Rev(Dˆ) and BRev(Dˆ)
remains sufficiently large as well. We use the following theorem:
Theorem 2 ([32]). Let D be a distribution, and D+ be a distribution that stochastically dominates
D. Let ∆ denote the random function v+− v, when couples v+ and v are sampled jointly from D+
and D. Finally, let Val(∆) be the expected welfare of VCG with buyers whose types are distributed
according to ∆. Then, for all such D, D+, ∆, and for every mechanism M for D and every ǫ > 0,
there exists a mechanism M ′ for D+ such that
Rev(M ′,D+) ≥ (1− ǫ) ·
(
Rev(M,D)− Val(∆)
ǫ
)
.
We apply this theorem for D = D, and D+ = Dˆ, which stochastically dominates D, and M the
optimal mechanism for D. Our noise model adds at most δ to the value of each item, therefore
Val(∆) ≤ 2δ. We set ǫ = 12 . Then:
Rev(Dˆ) ≥ Rev(M ′, Dˆ)
≥ 1
2
· (Rev(D)− 4δ)
≥ n
1/7
4n+1
− 2δ.
Finally, BRev(Dˆ) ≤ BRev(D) + 2δ ≤ 4−n + 2δ. Picking n ∈ Θ(ln(1δ )) completes the lemma.
F Unilluminating Alternative Models
In this section we briefly overview a few seemingly natural alternatives that unfortunately have
an unilluminating analysis (similar to the additive model from Section 2). It is certainly a
8These propositions appear in the arXiv version of [22] uploaded on 22 April, 2013.
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worthwhile direction for future research to identify different illuminating models, but
the point of this section is just to provide further evidence that doing so requires care. This section
only contains sketches and no formal proofs. Both alternatives below propose some restrictions
on the class of distributions D considered, and ask what guarantees can be made subject to these
restrictions.
F.1 Lower-bounded Density
Consider the following restriction on distributions: for all ~v in the support of D, f(~v) ∈ [δ, 1/δ].
Let K denote the support of D. There are two cases to consider:
First, maybe K is not convex. If K is not required to be convex, then we can take exactly the
construction of [5, 22] and turn each discrete point into a tiny uniform ball where the density is in
the range [δ, 1/δ], all without affecting the properties at all.
Second, maybe K is required to be convex. If K is convex, then consider L = max~v∈K{v1+v2}.
First, observe that at least 1/4 of the volume of K (not weighted by density in D) lies above the
line v1+ v2 ≥ L/2. To see this, consider shrinking K by a factor of 2 in all dimensions, and moving
it back to touch the line v1 + v2 = L. Then clearly this lies inside K, and has volume at least
vol(K)/4. Now, observe that because the density lies in [δ, 1/δ] everywhere, this means that the
total density of D above the line v1 + v2 ≥ L/2 is at least δ2/4. Therefore, by simply setting price
L/2 on the grand bundle, we can generate revenue Lδ2/8. The optimum revenue is clearly at most
L, so this guarantees an O(δ2) approximation. Like with the initial silly model, we simply don’t
learn anything from this analysis. All we learn is that if the densities are sufficiently bounded, then
you can get a decent approximation by picking a specific type and targeting them while ignoring
the rest.
F.2 Bounded away from Axes
Consider the following restriction on distributions: with probability 1 − δ, ~v ← D satisfies v1 ≥
δv2 ≥ δ2v1. In other words, ~v is sufficiently bounded away from the axes with non-negligible
probability. Unfortunately this buys us absolutely nothing. Consider the construction of [5, 22],
and the distribution D′ which draws from their construction with probability δ, and otherwise draw
from U([1, 2]× [1, 2]). Then the optimal revenue of this distribution is still infinite, and the revenue
of any mechanism with menu complexity C is at most O(C), even though with high probability it
is bounded away from the axes.
The above construction in fact works for any property. Consider restricting to distributions such
that with probability 1 − δ, ~v ← D has property X. Assuming that some ~v exists with property
X, let D′ draw from the [5, 22] construction with probability δ, and draw ~v otherwise. Then the
optimal revenue of this distribution is still infinite, yet the optimal revenue for any mechanism with
menu complexity C is at most O(C(v1 + v2)).
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